The Muhammadiyah in Indonesia is commonly known not to be very sympathetic towards mysticism in terms of its manifestations in mystical religious fraternities and pantheistic identity mysticism. Although its stance versus these religious phenomena seems to be very clear, many of its members are struggling to determine their attitude towards the issue. The continuing uncertainty about its legitimacy is evident from the questions Muhammadiyah members send to the Suara Muhammadiyah regarding this topic. In this article I focus on the Muhammadiyah's 'official' vision through its first hundred years of existence. My thesis is that its rigidness in rejecting 'mystical and spiritual' manifestations is not only caused by its fear of unbelief and heresy, but also closely related to the political and social circumstances in which it is confronted with these 'mystical and spiritual' manifestations in the first place.
about waḥdat al-wujūd, the 'Unity of Being' or 'oneness of existence' . This doctrine of monism had become one of the main lines of Islamic mysticism since Ibn al-ʿArabī (1165-1240), but was rejected here as a false doctrine not belonging to authentic Islamic mysticism. 6 In answering the three aforementioned questions, I will focus on three periods of the Muhammadiyah's history, namely: 1) the 1920s and 1930s; 2) the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s; and, 3) the 1990s. In each of these periods, mysticism, Sufism and tarekats appeared to be a cause of special concern for the board and leaders of the Muhammadiyah. A chronological and historical approach will show the evidence upon which Kusumodiprodjo's opinion was based and illuminate the long-standing 'official' stance of the Muhammadiyah towards mysticism, Sufism and tarekats. It also will make clear that the Muhammadiyah always distinguished Sufism and tarekats from mysticism without, however, giving a clear definition of these phenomena and their distinctions. Finally, answering these three questions will give a better insight into a part of the Muhammadiyah's twentieth-century identity, whether appropriated or ascribed.
The 1920s and 1930s
Although I do not know of any source written by Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of the Muhammadiyah movement, himself on the subject of mysticism, Sufism and tarekats, Muhammadiyah members who sympathize with Sufism always tend to stress the fact that, for him, Sufism was acceptable as an expression of Islamic piety. He is said to have studied Sufism before and during his two stays in Mecca, but rarely discussed the subject at official Muhammadiyah meetings later in his career.7 The tendency to consider Sufism a vital part of the religious life of Muslims grew even stronger after the 'turn to spirituality' of the 43rd Muktamar (1995), as will be become clear in the section on the 1990s below. Some Muhammadiyah members compared Ahmad Dahlan's religiosity with that of the attitude of al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) towards Sufism.8 This towering personality from the history of Islam is said to have been of the opinion that Islamic law without Islamic mysticism would become barren, while Islamic mysticism without Islamic law would lead to chaos. He also held that everything that could direct man to God without being contrary to the Islamic creed should be tolerated in Islam. In this way, he created a place for Islamic mysticism within Islam.9 A similar attitude seems to have characterized Muḥammad ʿAbduh , who is considered to be the founder of Islamic modernism. Following ʿAbduh, Ahmad Dahlan founded the Muhammadiyah in 1912 as Indonesia's first modernist Muslim movement. Al-Ghazālī, ʿAbduh and Ahmad Dahlan seemed to share the conviction that the value of Sufism was based on its possible contribution to a positive identification of its adherents with Islam and to an enhancement of their ethical behaviour (Ar. akhlāq) . It is necessary, however, to point out that some Muhammadiyah members believe Ahmad Dahlan to have opposed the mysticism of the tarekats because of their violation of the sharia (Ind.: syariah, the Islamic law). Therefore, he is thought to have criticized those forms of tarekat mysticism that might result in the abolition of the sharia.10 After Ahmad Dahlan passed away in 1923, the appreciation of Sufism seems to have decreased rapidly. On the one hand, this development was connected with the rise of modernist and nationalistic organizations in the country, many of whose members had received a Western-style education, while the educational background of the members of the religious fraternities traditionally was that of religious pesantren training. As a result, the modernist and nationalistic organizations were better equipped to cope with the challenges of modern times than the religious fraternities. These modernist and nationalistic organizations-the Muhammadiyah being one of them-thus duly took over the political functions of the religious fraternities, which resulted in the diminishing popularity of Sufism as manifested in the religious fraternities and in a dramatic decrease of their membership.11 On the other hand, the decreasing appreciation of mysticism, Sufism and tarekats also seems to be connected with the increasing influence of organizations like the Muhammadiyah. This development followed the pattern of Islamic modernism with its stress on the fact that the monotheism of Islam was irreconcilable with certain aspects of mysticism, such as the pantheistic doctrine of the unity of being. This critical stance against what, from the perspective of the Muhammadiyah, was considered to be heterodoxy and/or heteropraxy became institutionalized in the establishment of the Majlis Tarjih, the Muhammadiyah's 'Council of Consideration ' in 1927.12 This institution issued instructions and opinions in accordance with the rules of the sharia and thus led to a more rigid form of orthodoxy and orthopraxy.
The growth and increasing influence of modernist Muslim movements such as the Muhammadiyah and others incited the so-called 'traditionalist' Muslim ulamas, 'religious scholars' , to join forces to counterbalance 'modernist' Islam, to foster 'traditionalist' Islam and 'to give organisational voice to the interests of traditional Islam, and particularly the pesantren system' .13 The traditionalist ulamas feared that Islamic modernism would seriously affect their authority and harm their social and economic position.14 To resist this danger the Nahdlatul Ulama (nu) was founded by Wahab Chasbullah leaders of tarekats, who very often also possessed their own pesantren (a traditional Indonesian Islamic boarding school for studying classical Islamic subjects), associated themselves with the nu. Depending on the closeness of the relationship between the Muhammadiyah and the nu, there would either be constant and fierce criticism of the close affiliation between the nu and the tarekats, or it would be cloaked in very implicit terms. In times when the Muhammadiyah and the nu were working closely together, as was the case for instance in the Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia from 1937 until the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, Muhammadiyah's criticism was no more than implicit and without mentioning the name of the nu. Another reason for the decreasing appreciation of mysticism, Sufism and tarekats after Ahmad Dahlan's death is connected with the bitter criticism of the mysticism of the tarekats expressed by Muhammadiyah members and sympathizers in Minangkabau, West Sumatra. In this region, the modernist Hajji Abdul Karim Amrullah (1879-1945), better known under his nickname Hajji Rasul, father of the famous Muhammadiyah leader Hamka (1908-81) ,15 had a bitter struggle with the religious fraternities. He was sympathetic to the Muhammadiyah but, unlike his son Hamka, never became a member. In his opinion, the tarekats undermined Islam with their mysticism in which magic, ecstasy and animistic practices played an important role. 16 According to Hamka in his biography of his father's life, the teachings of his father were directed against the pantheistic mysticism of al-Ḥallāj (858-922) as propagated by Hamzah Fansuri (d. 1590) in Sumatra. 17 However, Rasul lashed out in particular against the practice of rabita, a technique with which the disciple learned to fully concentrate on his shaykh as the infallible guide on the mystical path. Rasul declared rabita a bidʿa, an innovation and a heresy contrary to Islamic law, because the shaykh became the mediator between the novice and God. 18 The underlying thought is that mediatorship easily changes into attributing associates to God, (Ar.: shirk; Ind.: syirik and syirk, usually translated as 'polytheism'), one of the gravest sins in Islam, as is often repeated by prominent Muhammadiyah members.19 With this perspective Rasul set himself up as the strictest interpreter in Indonesia of the opinions of Ahmad Khatib (d. 1916) . 20 This scholar was born in Minangkabau but lived and worked for the greater part of his life in Mecca. He enjoyed great fame among Indonesians who came to the Holy City of Islam to study under his spiritual guidance. Through his teaching and books, Ahmad Khatib had a far-reaching influence on his countrymen, both modernists and traditionalists. In several of his books, he denounced the practices of the Naqshbandiyya (Ind.: Naqsyabandiyah) fraternity regarding mysticism, especially its technique of rabita. Apparently, Rasul proved such a good student of Ahmad Khatib that many Muhammadiyah members considered his attitude worthy of imitation. After all, notwithstanding the fact that his father Muhammad Amrullah was a Naqshbandiyya shaykh, Rasul mercilessly combated the mysticism of this religious fraternity in both word and in deed. 21 Rasul, however, seemed to have been more lenient regarding Sufism than regarding the tarekats, which is evident from an article he published in 1932 in the Almanak Moehammadijah Tahoen Hidjrah 1351. In this article, entitled 'Tasawoef Islam' , Rasul listed five principles Sufism had to comply with to be acceptable to Islam. These five principles all dealt with the role Sufism had to play in purifying the inner self of the Muslims and in keeping it from heretical innovations and sins.22 Thus, only if mysticism contributed to purifying the faith and stimulating good works, was it acceptable to Islam according to Rasul.23 In this respect, Hamka seemingly followed in the footsteps of his father Rasul. In his very popular and often reprinted book Tasauf Moderen, which was in fact a collection of previously published articles and was published as a book for the first time in 1939, Hamka defended the view that the Sufism of early, pristine Islam was focused on the formation of a noble character and that indeed the aim of Sufism was to purify the soul and to educate the inner self. However, he rejected the kind of Sufism that stressed asceticism by which, according to Hamka, 
The 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s
The growing popularity of mysticism and the booming of kebatinan organizations since Indonesian Independence in 1945 created the impression that Indonesia was not predominantly populated by sharia-abiding Muslims. This fact was supposedly confirmed by the outcome of the first general elections of Indonesia in 1955, in which the Islamic parties received only 42% of the votes.36 However, the Muhammadiyah continued to oppose the doctrines and practices of various mystical groups, which it rejected as bidʿa or shirk. Moreover, it also strongly challenged the opinion that most of the adherents of those groups, commonly associated with abangan or 'nominal' Muslims, were not really Muslims. Therefore, the Muhammadiyah deemed it to be its duty to bring back 
Under Sukarno
The years after Independence were turbulent and unstable. After shaking off the yoke of colonial rule, Indonesia was confronted with the armed battle between government troops and Islamic movements, known as Darul Islam movements, which sought to make Indonesia a state under Islamic law.37 During the same period (1948-65), communism gained an increasingly firm foothold in Indonesia, causing conflicts and clashes between different sides. Simultaneously, Christian missionary activities were expanding. The economy was in decline and so were prosperity and welfare. Urban migration disrupted society and traditional family life. In these circumstances, in which all moral values and norms seemed to have been eroded, the Javanese were searching for a new identity. Mysticism in its manifestation of kebatinan, according to researchers exploring the phenomenon during this period, offered the Javanese the possibility of rediscovering their authentic, original cultural identity, stripped of foreign ideologies such as Christianity, Islam and communism.38
The proliferation of mysticism and mystical religious fraternities, often centred in 'tarekat, pesantren' that were established in great numbers in the 1950s, was opposed passionately by Muhammadiyah members and other Apparently, Fakih Usman's proposal was not broadly supported, neither politically nor socially, one of the reasons being the protests of the adherents of Balinese Hinduism which did not meet the formal criteria either. As a result, the government shirked its responsibilities by rejecting the proposal, ascribing it to Fakih Usman's personal conviction. Dimyati held the following, very negative opinion regarding kebatinan, which he calls 'new religions': 'These new religions are produced by people of unsound mind who do not actually understand the nature of Islam. Therefore, they themselves carelessly design "the true nature of Islam". Their doctrine found a ready reception with their disciples, who are nothing more than stupid fools without any understanding of Islam. These new religions are no religions and that is why they cannot be tolerated. They cause chaos and anarchy, and ruin our society. The same holds true for Hinduism and its propaganda. If tolerated, it will damage the interest of freedom and democracy because of its revitalization of pre-Muslim paganism by which our development will slide back for several thousands of years' (my translation (Badan Kongres Kebatinan Seluruh Indonesia), the 'All Indonesian Congress of Kebatinan' , was established on the initiative of Wongsonegoro (1897-1978), a Minister in several cabinets and the leading member of the kebatinan, to combine the forces of all mystical groups in one representative, official body. To avoid the association with religion and to refute the criticism of Muslims, the bkki decided to renounce the term 'new religion' and to use the term kebatinan henceforth. The second Congress of the bkki, held in Solo in 1956, publicly stated that kebatinan was not a religion but simply aimed to improve the quality of religious life in Indonesia. The way in which this was to be achieved was described by way of the three principles of kebatinan during the fifth bkki Congress in 1961. Kebatinan aimed at the perfection of man by stressing the fact that he must not be actuated by self-interest; that he had to receive a moral education focused on character building; and that he had to place God in the centre of his daily life, in his thoughts as well as in his deeds. 
Under Suharto
It is a striking phenomenon in the contemporary history of Indonesia that time and again, when political oppression increases and social and economic circumstances are uncertain that the number of mystical movements grows. Such was the case after the abortive coup of 30 September, 1965. In addition to political oppression, several other reasons are given for the popularity and success of kebatinan movements. For example, it has been argued that those people who no longer expected anything of the world turned to mysticism as a source of moral power. They felt disappointed by the officially recognized religions, in particular in that, in their view, they did not contribute in any way 54 to the formation of a morally powerful human being.57 Seeking solace in mysticism can also be viewed as a reaction against the dogmatism and ritualism of the officially recognized monotheistic religions that ignored the need of the Javanese to express their inner experiences in a mystical way.58 A third possible explanation of the appeal of mysticism is its function as a haven for those who sought their salvation in the mysticism of religious fraternities and mystical associations because they were longing for the solidarity of a small community. This feeling of solidarity had been lost as a result of urban migration.59 The growth of social mobility, the various types of work and the progress of urbanisation had ended in individualization and alienation that, in turn, had led to the loss of old social ties and networks. The mystical associations were expected to create a social and religious framework with common norms and values.60 Thus, for the latter group of people, turning to mysticism was a reaction to the threat of modernity and a protest against its attendant deterioration of morals. A fourth explanation can be found in the politicisation of Islam. Efforts by Muslim modernists, among others, to give Islam a more important position in politics prompted Muslims not interested in politics to join mystical associations or religious fraternities. Finally, the search for a personal cultural identity, which was considered to have been lost as a result of the protracted foreign political and religious dominance, has been mentioned as a reason for turning to mysticism as well.61
In general, the position of several kebatinan groups and religious fraternities grew stronger after the abortive coup, although some groups, suspected of having been infiltrated by communists or of being inclined to subversive actions, were banned and suppressed.62 The kebatinan groups owed the strengthening of their position to their backing by the army and by Golkar, the 'government party' .63 According to the modernist Muslim opponents of kebatinan the military and government circles believed that it was necessary to secure the support of Muslims who were affiliated with mystical associations. These organisations could counterbalance those Muslims whose activities, whether or not in connection with a Muslim political party, were considered by the government to be dangerous to the state. Muslims seeking to establish a state under Islamic Law were especially considered to be a threat which had to be counteracted. The leaders of the mystical associations and their members felt indebted to Golkar for the de facto recognition of their right to exist. Recognition also implied a certain protection against modernist and fundamentalist Muslims who did not have a great deal of sympathy for their mystical-minded fellow believers. Thus, with the invitation of Wongsonegero, as the exponent of the kebatinan groups, to join Golkar, in February, 1970, the process of a kind of official recognition of kebatinan by the government was started.64 This process is of vital importance for understanding the controversy between the Muhammadiyah and some kebatinan groups, like the Pangestu association.
The implications of the overtures made by Golkar to the kebatinan associations in view of the national elections of 1971 were well understood by politically engaged Muslims.65 Golkar's rapprochement was a clear attempt to weaken the Muslim political parties. They reacted indirectly to the government's policy by criticizing the kebatinan associations. This criticism centred on their sustained effort to be recognized as a religion. To facilitate recognition, it was decided at the national kebatinan conference in Yogyakarta of 7-9 November, 1970 to use, from then on, the name of aliran kepercayaan, 'current of belief' , instead of the name aliran kebatinan, 'current of mysticism' .66 At the same time it was decided to create a new umbrella organisation, the Sekretariat Kerjasama antar Kepercayaan, Kebatinan, Kejiwaan dan Kerochanian, the 'Coordinating Secretariat of Belief Movements' , to replace the bkki of 1955.67 The two main reasons for the change of name were, first, the fact that the name kebatinan had been contaminated by its association with klenik. The second, more important reason was the connotation of the term kepercayaan, which suggested official recognition by the Indonesian Constitution in which 'religion' (Ind.: agama) and 'belief' (Ind.: kepercayaan) are mentioned in the 64 Mulder, Mysticism, 7; and Patty, ' "Aliran Kepercayaan" ' , 10. 65 Patty, ' "Aliran Kepercayaan" ' , 90. 66 Although from then on, the name aliran kepercayaan was officially used, I will, for the sake of clarity, continue to use the name of kebatinan. However, it is worth remembering that, until 1955, the name 'new religions' was generally used to indicate all kinds of mystical movements. From 1955 until 1970, the name kebatinan was popular; and after 1970, aliran kepercayaan was the official name. article on religion.68 The juxtaposition of religion and belief in this article was understood by adherents of the aliran kepercayaan as recognition that belief was on par with religion, under the influence of the interpretation of Professor Pringgodigdo (1904-88), a former member of the committee which prepared the Indonesian Constitution of 1945.69 In addition, by using this name, the adherents of the aliran kepercayaan wanted to express their loyalty to the Indonesian Constitution and to the government in power. 70 Criticism from the side of the modernist Muslims was expressed publicly. They contended that the adherents of kebatinan were in fact not at all loyal to the Indonesian Constitution since they were a source of discord in the country. For example, some very negative articles on kebatinan were published in Harian Abadi, an Islamic newspaper, between 9 and 13 March, 1972. The tenor of these articles was the fact that the glorification of the grand Javanese past was the central point of kebatinan. This glorification was a real threat to the national unity of the country, because the other Indonesian regions might start to glorify their own past in reaction to the Javanese attitude. The ultimate goal of kebatinan, according to Harian Abadi, was to supplant Islam and the other religions of Indonesia and to eliminate them. Thus, dissension would be sown among the Indonesian people. 71 The Muslims, on the other hand, argued that Islam was characterized by its unifying and integrating power. As far as the Muhammadiyah was concerned, some of its officials warned against the danger of kebatinan and its threat to Islam as early as in 1958.72 Therefore it was not a surprise that Muhammadiyah members also became publicly engaged in the polemic with the kebatinan associations in general and the Pangestu association in particular. A few months after the aforementioned articles appeared in Harian Abadi, a heated dispute between a Pangestu adherent and two Muhammadiyah members was published in Harian Kami Jakarta, a Jakarta daily, in May and June, 1972.
In the dispute in Harian Kami Jakarta, the mystical association Pangestu was represented by an adherent, Mr. Warsito, a colonel living in the Central Javanese town of Magelang. Warsito, who also took active part in the mystical association Sumarah, was the self-appointed spokesperson of kebatinan at the national level.73 The Muhammadiyah representatives were the well-known and very strict Professor M. Rasjidi and Mr. Hasbullah Bakry.74 The dispute was started by Warsito, who had tried, in the first newspaper article, to refute 'the misunderstanding of kebatinan in Muslim circles' . Rasjidi and Hasbullah Bakry reacted vehemently to Warsito's article. Their reaction revealed the feeling of the Muhammadiyah as a modernist, yet orthodox Muslim movement towards kebatinan. The severe criticism of the two Muhammadiyah representatives towards the Pangestu association was perhaps also a reflection of the Muhammadiyah's concern about the great attention Pangestu received and about its growing membership, the majority of which had a Muslim background.
Rasjidi Rasjidi could easily have accused several kebatinan groups of claiming to possess a revelation, which, according to Islam, is a sign of unbelief. The Qur'an was God's latest revelation to mankind, after which he would send no other revelations. However, the card Rasjidi was playing was the political one. He pointed at the danger which kebatinan associations posed to the unity and stability of Indonesia and its potential put a brake on national development. Rasjidi knew better than anybody that the Indonesian government was more sensitive to the themes of unity, stability and development than to the subtleties of theological hair splitting. A religion would only catch on by linking it to the themes of the unity, stability and development of Indonesia.
The theme of Islam stimulating man to act positively to promote social progress also occupied a leading role in Rasjidi's dispute with Warsito. 1792) were not Muslims. He gave Warsito a serious warning, given the danger of his opinions in the highly inflammable religious situation in Indonesia.82 Secondly, Rasjidi stressed the fact that a true Muslim did not pursue the mystical union of man and God because that attitude obstructed every possibility of development. In other words, mysticism or kebatinan ended in stagnation. 83 In refuting Warsito's argument, Rasjidi played the trump card regarding stability and development, which were the two main points of the policies of the early Suharto government. After the abortive coup of 30 September, 1965, Suharto was fully aware of the explosive religious situation in his country. He realised that stability was a prerequisite for building up the nation under the New Order. Only after stability was established in Indonesia could the development of the country in the social, economic, and political fields be taken up. Therefore, religious stability was essential. Indeed, religion had to be called in for the sake of the socio-economic construction of the country. By revealing the threat which kebatinan in general, and Pangestu in particular, posed to stability, and, in consequence, their obstruction of national development, Rasjidi was trying to win the government over to support the case of Islam instead of the case of kebatinan. If modernity is to be the goal, there must be a transformation of values, which means the abandonment of mysticism. . . . In some sense, mysticism is all that the tani has left. . . .
[A]nd it is a primary barrier to his modernization' . Contra, e.g., Peacock, 'Creativity of tradition' , 351: 'In general, however, the deepest and most enduring forces of change and renewal in Indonesian life seem to have come less from the reforms urged by purism than from the frustratingly enigmatic and only seemingly stagnant symbols, practices, and worldview of a mystical syncretism' .
In his contribution to the dispute with Warsito, Hasbullah Bakry also strongly rejected Pangestu's view. Bakry (b. 1926) was a member of the Muhammadiyah and a lecturer at various Islamic institutes of higher education. In 1977, he was appointed Professor of Islamic law and the Study of Comparative Religion at the Universitas Islam in Jakarta. According to Bakry, the study of comparative religion played an important part in showing the superiority of Islam and in revealing the inadequacy of all non-Islamic religions and beliefs.84 Islam is the touchstone for judging kebatinan. Hasbullah Bakry stated that the doctrine of man becoming one with God was absolutely wrong. The only correct belief was that man must serve God as his servant.85 Likewise, Bakry was opposed to Pangestu's 'Trinitarian' doctrine of God and the doctrine of the unity of being. He condemned the first doctrine as polytheism while the second was denounced as pantheism. Actually, according to Hasbullah Bakry, adherents of Pangestu could be put on a par with Christians and Buddhists; they were unbelievers (Ar.: kāfir) and polytheists (Ar.: mushrik).86 The doctrine of Pangestu was also repudiated in other Muhammadiyah publications as a doctrine incompatible with the teachings of Islam. The belief that creator and creature were identical was founded on pantheism and clashed with Islamic orthodoxy. 87 However, in spite of the fierce criticism from the Muslim quarter, especially from modernists like members of the Muhammadiyah, the process of trying to get kebatinan accepted as a religion continued. The year 1973 was promising for the adherents of kebatinan. After its victory in the 1971 general elections, Golkar used its majority in the Majlis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (mpr), the 'People's Consultative Assembly' or Indonesian Parliament, to reward kebatinan adherents for their support. In the Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara, the 'Broad Lines of the State Policy' of 1973,88 the mpr mentioned the adherents of kebatinan in such a way that they could consider themselves to be on par with the adherents of the officially recognized religions. 89 The reaction of the Muhammadiyah on the juxtaposition of agama, 'religion' , and kepercayaan, 'belief' , taking place in the mpr was vehement. In an editorial in the Suara Muhammadiyah of February, 1973, this process was called a strong opposition against Islam and a glorification of pre-Islamic Javanese tradition. The bi-weekly Muhammadiyah magazine, for instance, referred to the plan of kebatinan adherents to introduce an official kebatinan holiday, 1 Sura (the first day of the Javanese calendar year), with ceremonies which, according to Islam, were pagan. The magazine expressed its disapproval of the food offerings (Jav.: sesajen) which were brought on 1 Sura and the procession which took place on that day. The objects from the Mangkunegaran court of Surakarta which were carried around during the procession were certainly not only meant for tourists but were considered to be sacred heirlooms possessing supernatural qualities and magic powers (Ind.: keramat). 90 The 29 March, 1973 edition of the Islamic newspaper Harian Abadi was even more explicit in its editorial. It stated that never before in the history of Indonesia since its Independence, had kebatinan been equated with Islam. In fact, kebatinan could only be ranked with religious phenomena such as spiritualism. Thus, kebatinan was labelled takhayul, 'superstition' . 91 The controversy between modernist Muslims and kebatinan witnessed a new climax at the end of 1977. At that time, it became publicly known that, when they were to be inaugurated as members of Parliament on 1 October, 1977, the adherents of kebatinan intended to swear their oath or to make their affirmation as adherents of the aliran kepercayaan. Up to that moment, it had only been possible to swear the oath or to make the affirmation as an adherent of one of the recognized religions, namely Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, or Buddhism. Again, modernists and other Muslims were afraid that the authorization of swearing the oath or making the affirmation as an adherent of the aliran kepercayaan could be interpreted as a recognition of this religious movement as an official religion.92 Under the direction of Professor Hamka, the abovementioned prominent member of the Muhammadiyah, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (mui) lashed out at the ambition of the kebatinan adherents.
The mui was a council of religious specialists established by the Indonesian government in 1975. It was supposedly independent of the government which it was tasked to advise, on request or otherwise, on religious affairs. From its very foundation, Hamka had been its chairman until, due to his fatwa on Christmas celebrations, he felt obliged to resign in 1981.93 The mui labelled the aliran kepercayaan as a false religion which had been created by the Dutch during their colonial rule to weaken Islam. In addition to this value judgment, the mui formulated three firm arguments why the aliran kepercayaan should not be acknowledged as a religion. Firstly, the aliran kepercayaan was contrary to the doctrine of Pancasila and to the Constitution. The claim of the kebatinan adherents that the aliran kepercayaan had been recognized under the Constitution was invalid. The words 'according to his own religion and belief' ('menurut agamanya dan kepercayaannya itu' , § 29:2 of the Constitution) could not, according to the mui, be interpreted as an official recognition of the aliran kepercayaan. The demonstrative itu made it clear that kepercayaan referred to agama. Consequently, belief was not independent of religion. This interpretation of the mui was shared by some prominent Indonesian Muslims. For instance, Hatta, a member of the preparatory committee of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 and Indonesia's first vice-president, stated that kepercayaan in fact referred to Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism.94 Given the separation of kepercayaan from agama, the aliran kepercayaan harmed the national unity of Indonesia and threatened its stability. Finally, it was at odds with Suharto's appeal of 29 April, 1976, where he summoned the adherents of the aliran kepercayaan to return to the bosom of their original religion. The mui shared the President's point of view. 95 The issue of the oath or affirmation as an adherent of the aliran kepercayaan also stirred emotions in Muhammadiyah circles. As a result, considerable attention was paid to the issue of the aliran kepercayaan during the meeting of its Majlis Tanwir, the highest advisory body of the Muhammadiyah, of 15-19 December 1977. Hamka again acted as the most important advisor of the Muhammadiyah regarding the issue of the aliran kepercayaan. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the Majlis Tanwir turned out to share the conclusions of the mui. The attitude of the Muhammadiyah versus the adherents of the aliran kepercayaan was formulated in even stronger words: if the adherents of the aliran kepercayaan did not return to the bosom of their original religion, they had to be considered murtadd, 'apostate' . As for the aliran kepercayaan, it was inkonstitusional, 'unconstitutional' . 97 However, some Muhammadiyah members defended mysticism during the 1970s. One of them was A. Mukti Ali (1923 Ali ( -2006 . Already in the 1950s, he pointed to the fact that, from its early history, the Muhammadiyah had always been receptive to the ethical and purifying potentialities of mysticism.98 As Minister of Religion (1971-8), Mukti Ali recaptured this attitude to mysticism.99 He tried to convince Muslim preachers that they had to pay more attention to the meaning of mysticism in the lives of the Javanese; they had to bear in mind that mysticism was the kind of belief which satisfied the Javanese mind best. Muslim preachers, especially Muhammadiyah ones, were too much inclined to focus on Islamic law and its injunctions. With this approach, they had alienated mystical-minded Muslims who detested Islam when it was interpreted in a too formal and narrow way.100 Mukti Ali who, as a Minister of Religion and representative of the government, had to address kebatinan meetings several times on its 1 Sura holiday, exhorted the Muslim preachers to open their eyes to the spiritual needs of their fellow believers. He stressed that, if they continued to ignore these needs, the Javanese Muslims would search for truth in 
Transition from the 1970s to the 1990s
The danger of a change of denomination or even religion was not hypothetical. Many former students of Muhammadiyah educational institutions had already left the movement and joined the Shattariyah fraternity for instance, a tarekat affiliated with the nu, the largest Muslim organization of Indonesia representing the interests of traditionalist movements.106 Several rather prominent figures of the Muhammadiyah joined the kebatinan association Sumarah.107 This tendency did not pass unnoticed in Muhammadiyah circles. To counteract this tendency, the Muhammadiyah published the book Kebatinan dan dakwah kepada orang Jawa in 1984. This book was meant to be used only in Muhammadiyah circles and was aimed at discouraging the influence of Seh Siti Jenar and his doctrine on contemporary Indonesian Muslims. Seh Siti Jenar was a more-or-less legendary Muslim preacher from the fifteenth or sixteenth century who was sentenced to death because contemporary orthodox Muslims condemned his doctrine of radical monism as heretical. One of the contributors to the book was Syukriyanto ar (b. 1945). He was a son of ar Fachruddin and was one of the leaders of Muhammadiyah's Majlis Tabligh, the council concerned with the instruction methods of deepening the understanding regarding Islam of Muslims in general and its members in particular. Syukrianto ar warned the missionaries of the Muhammadiyah to beware of Muslims who were dissatisfied with Islam and joined a kebatinan association as a result; many of them might ultimately convert to Christianity.108 To discourage this tendency, the Muhammadiyah took a more positive attitude towards mysticism in the mid-1990s, despite its criticism of and anxiety about Sufism. 109 The threat of competition by kebatinan and other non-Islamic religions, especially Christianity, and doctrinal motives were two of the reasons why the Muhammadiyah opposed mysticism. The Muhammadiyah also feared mysticism to be only a transitional stage to a definitive change of religion. Already before the wwii, the Protestant mission had alluded to the possibilities of entering into relations with mysticism movements to forestall the modernist Muhammadiyah.110 Developments after the abortive coup of 30 September, 1965 caused the Muhammadiyah to take a firm stand towards kebatinan, as was shown by the sharp controversy between representatives of the Muhammadiyah and the Pangestu. However, it is also clear, pace Nakamura, that for the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s the same holds true as for the 1920s and 1930s: within the Muhammadiyah, there was neither room for esoteric mysticism with a renunciation of the world nor for tarekats threatening and violating the prescriptions and interdictions of the sharia. The fact that Sufism stimulated ihsan and thus contributed to the formation of an ethical life was considered acceptable. 111 However, those practices and beliefs of Sufism and tarekats that contradicted the sharia and that, according to Muhammadiyah's normative standards, could be labelled as imaginations (Ind.: takhayyul), heretical innovations (Ind.: bid'ah) or superstition (Ind.: khurafat or churafat) resulting in unbelief and polytheism (Ar.: shirk; Ind.: syirik), were continuously and vigorously resisted. These three evils were mostly abbreviated to tbc, the Dutch and Indonesian acronym for tuberculosis, a long-time feared and often deadly disease. It has been claimed that in his struggle for the purification of Islam, Ahmad Dahlan had made the eradication of tbc one of the primary goals of the Muhammadiyah. Now, ever since the nu was founded, whenever there were tensions between the Muhammadiyah and the nu, the Muhammadiyah would often accuse the nu and especially its associated tarekats of suffering from tbc. Implicitly, this was also still the case in the 1970s, as becomes clear from the book Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam, 'The Muhammadiyah as an Islamic movement' , the first edition of which was published in 1971.112 In this book, the authors look to explain to students attending the upper secondary schools of the Muhammadiyah, as well as to ordinary members of the organization, what kind of organization the Muhammadiyah is and what it stands for. To define the character of the Muhammadiyah, they deal with, for example, the position of the organization in relation to other Islamic groups and the Islamic schools of law. One of the organizations they pay attention to is the nu, which is described quite even-handedly in a separate section.113 However, in the section dedicated to Muhammadiyah's social and religious activities the authors mention the fact that the organization has always made great efforts to eradicate religious traditions which, according to its conviction, do not belong to pure and pristine Islam. Without mentioning the nu by name, they listed various reprehensible traditions, such as visiting the grave of the founder of a tarekat (Ar.: ziyāra; Ind.: ziarah) and seeking his intercession (tawassul) for the relief of needs or the fulfilment of wishes, both of which are typical of tarekats affiliated with the nu. Selamatans (the ritual, communal meals held in honour of the founder of a tarekat), khauls (the annual celebrations commemorating the death of the founder of a tarekat), manaqibans (the monthly ritual recita-tions in praise of the excellences of the founder of a tarekat), and several other traditions practiced by members of the tarekats, such as certain forms of dhikr (repetition of the divine names or religious formulae), tahlils (repetition of the first part of the Islamic profession of faith) and selawatans (special invocation of the prophet Muhammad), are summed up by the authors of Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam and severely criticised as heretical customs.114
The difference in attitude of the Muhammadiyah towards the kebatinan movements and the nu during the 1970s could possibly be explained by Suharto's policy of the 'domestication of Islam' in Indonesia.115 This policy was focused on the elimination of Islam as a political opponent and culminated in the forced acceptance of the Pancasila doctrine by all social and religious organizations as their 'one and only' principle. Reluctantly, the Muhammadiyah finally decided to accept this principle in 1984. The fact that a prominent Muhammadiyah representative like Rasjidi only used political arguments in his refutation of the kebatinan movements in my opinion proves that the Muhammadiyah considered them as being part of the tools in the hands of the Suharto government to counterbalance the political aspirations of modernist Muslims.
One of the measures taken to implement Suharto's policy of the 'domestication of Islam' was the introduction of all kinds of educational reforms aiming at the formation of loyal Pancasila citizens. As part of these reforms, important changes were made for instance in the curriculum of the iains (Institut Agama Islam Negeri), the higher educational 'State Institutes for Islamic Studies' operated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. A pivotal role in this reformation was played by Harun Nasution (1919-98), an influential and controversial leading Indonesian intellectual who became rector of the iain Jakarta in 1973. He wanted to develop and stimulate the morality of the students by introducing the study of Sufism as an obligatory discipline of the iain's curriculum. The Muhammadiyah's shift to a more positive evaluation of Sufism can be seen as a response to the growing popularity of mysticism emerging during the 1970s and 1980s. According to Julia Howell, this is borne out by the increasing sale of books on this topic and widespread discussions on university campuses regarding Sufism. She also points to the fact that Sufism and tarekats were especially popular with members of the 'well-educated and religiously committed Muslim middle and upper classes' .126 As said in the previous section, a pivotal role in popularizing this new form of Sufism, or urban taṣawwuf, was played by the neo-modernist Nurcholish Madjid and his spiritual sympathizers, who were heavily influenced by Hamka's ideas of Sufism. 127 However, Howell also shows that Sufism and the tarekats were adapted 'to a variety of new institutional forms in urban settings' and that these 'new types of "Sufi" institutions of the 1990s avoid[ed] this association with kebatinan by explicitly presenting themselves as Muslim' .128 The 'threat' of kebatinan lessened when it was brought under the newly created Department of Culture and Tourism. This allocation was regarded as a symbolical downgrading of the kebatinan groups, which were now perceived as a kind of 'folklore' .129 As Indonesia was becoming more and more religiously diverse, Sufism was also growing more popular because, for many moderate Muslims, it counterbalanced the rise of religious fundamentalism in Indonesia since the 1980s.130 
Conclusions
In answering the three questions formulated at the beginning of this contribution, it should be concluded that Hardjono Kusumodiprodjo's opinion regarding the Muhammadiyah's rejection of Sufism and 'tarekat' teaching requires
